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The French revolutionaries thought of human emancipation in a triptych, as freedom, equality, and fraternity. These could be three distinct values or three facets of the same value. Immanuel Kant holds the latter view. For Kant, the revolutionary triptych represents three facets of the unconditional value of humanity as an end in itself. Kant’s political philosophy couches this representation in terms of an innate, pre-institutional right to freedom possessed by all humans as such. All other political rights and values are supposed to follow from that right. But Kant also emends the content of the revolutionary triptych. Citizenship, he argues, amounts to freedom (Freiheit), equality (Gleichheit), and civil self-sufficiency (Selbständigkeit). The first two attributes amount to freely consenting equals before the law. The interpretative question is what the third attribute adds to the first two: what does civil self-sufficiency add to free consent by equal juridical subjects? This Element provides a unifying interpretation of Kant’s theory of citizenship that responds to this question. I argue that Selbständigkeit contributes the idea of interdependent independence: the citizens’ use of their interdependent rightful powers independently of the private choices of each. Kant’s citizens are independent in the contrastive sense that their private choices do not depend on someone else’s. But that does not make them independent of society, like the proverbial noble savage. Kantian independence does not amount to selfmastery – dependence only on one’s own choices. Rather, I will argue that Kant’s account of independence presupposes the interdependence of free and equal people through a public power, which enables each person to act independently of the private choices of others. I will begin by showing that Kant’s account of interdependence presupposes a social division of labour. The rightful condition, on Kant’s view, involves free and equal people cooperating on the basis of reciprocally acceptable justifications. They thereby serve each other as equals, not as servants. Differently stated, the independence of free and equal people presupposes their ‘selfstanding’ ability to exercise their civil rights. And this, in turn, presupposes that each control her share of society’s productive assets. So citizenship and poverty, as mediated by the social division of labour, are inextricably connected. A corollary of my interpretation is that poverty and wage-labour are not, in Kant’s mind, justifiable forms of social standing. This is because no justification can be offered to former serfs or nascent proletarians for being servants of lords or of capitalists, respectively. So Kant’s bigger picture sees the modern state as a system of cooperative production, in which the producers rightfully possess certain (productive) powers, whose interdependent exercise independently of private permission matters for justice. The empirical form of Kant’s ideal is a republic of independent commodity producers. I will then show that this reading of Selbständigkeit can consistently explain Kant’s disenfranchisement of women, wage labourers, and landless farmers; that it offers a robust alternative to influential Neoroman, libertarian, and proprietarian interpretations of the Kantian state; and that it can buttress an original account of community as productive interdependence. I will also explain how it anticipates Hegel’s discussion of the division of labour, Marx’s account of commodity fetishism and alienated labour, and Rawls theory of the well-ordered society. This straight line from Kant to Marx begins with Rousseau, who takes the undifferentiated unity of the ancient democratic republics to be both infeasible and undesirable. The division of labour, Rousseau reasons, has forever put social undifferentiation behind. But he is concerned that the division of labour and the concomitant proliferation of private property might sow political disunity. His solution in the Social Contract is to subsume the economically induced differentiation under the unity of the general will (Rousseau 1973). That discussion presupposes a distinction between sovereignty and government. The former preserves political unity by creating general laws, while the latter preserves social differentiation by interpreting and applying these laws. Kant keeps the dualist structure of Rousseau’s argumentation but adds a systematic derivation of Rousseau’s conclusions from the point of view of the innate right of humanity.1 This systematization, Kant thinks, preserves the differentiation of free and equal people without giving in to the disunity sown by private property and the division of labour.