دانلود کتاب جنگ در سوریه و خاورمیانه

Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed with astonishing speed over the span of less than two weeks, between late November and early December 2024, bringing an end to fifty-four years of Assad family rule in Syria. The rapid pace of these events was extraordinary, even dizzying, and marked a long-awaited moment of triumph for millions of Syrians both within the country and across a vast diaspora. Scenes of jubilation and disbelief unfolded in Damascus and other cities, as families were reunited and countless Syrians returned to their homeland. However, amid all the elation, the horrors of the Assad regime were laid bare. Civilians entered Sednaya and other notorious prisons, freeing thousands of gaunt, traumatized survivors and discovered large numbers of bodies and grotesque instruments of torture—grim testaments to decades of Baʿthist brutality. Even more chilling, it soon became clear that of the more than 100,000 people the regime had forcibly disappeared, the vast majority were no longer alive. The regime’s downfall stemmed from multiple factors: first and foremost, the pervasive corruption and systemic failures of Assad and his inner circle, which only grew worse over time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further compounded the regime’s vulnerabilities, diverting Russian military resources and attention away from Syria. Meanwhile, Haʾyat Tahrir al-Sham, the dominant rebel group in Idlib, focused on enhancing its military capabilities, procuring small arms from corrupt regime forces and other rebel factions while manufacturing drones, rockets, and missiles in improvised facilities, relying extensively on dual-use technologies such as 3D printers. The October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks on Israel and the ensuing Israeli military campaign in Gaza had destabilizing ripple effects across the region. Hezbollah, which had expected a short, limited war, miscalculated by opening a new front along Israel’s northern border on October 8, 2023. Israel’s subsequent campaign against Hezbollah killed much of the organization’s leadership; obliterated critical weapon stockpiles and manufacturing facilities; and compelled the redeployment of significant numbers of Hezbollah fighters from Syria to Lebanon. Sensing Assad’s growing weakness and isolation, Syrian rebels launched their sur prise offensive on November 27, 2024—the very day Israel and Lebanon reached a ceasefire agreement—to capitalize on Hezbollah’s diminished strength before it could regroup and reorganize. Haʾyat Tahrir al-Sham and allied rebel groups, including most prominently, factions of the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army, first attacked government forces along the frontlines in Idlib. Without Hezbollah’s support, the demoralized and poorly paid soldiers did not put up much resistance. Many fled their positions, leaving behind uniforms, weapons, and military vehicles. By November 29, the entire city of Aleppo and all military bases in adjoining areas were under rebel control. On December 5, the rebels took Hama. The victorious rebel forces then pressed on toward Homs. These momentous developments sparked new uprisings in the south, where a hastily formed rebel coalition easily took Darʿa. Hours later, the rebels captured both Suwayda and Homs and pressed on toward Damascus. The suburbs of Jaramana and Daraya were the first parts of the capital to come under rebel control. On December 8, the rebels were in full control of Damascus. The same day, news emerged that Assad had fled to Russia. The commander of Haʾyat Tahrir al-Sham, Ahmed al-Sharʿa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, emerged as the leading figure of the rebel coalition controlling Syria. In speeches and interviews, he attempted to position himself as a pragmatist committed to defending minority rights. He spoke of institution building and the need for a civilian government. Haʾyat Tahrir al-Sham even announced a general amnesty for conscripted soldiers in the Syrian military. And the new interim administration that Haʾyat Tahrir al-Sham established in Damascus went on to declare that Syria would adopt a free-market capitalist system, suggesting a clear break from Baʿthist economics. These moves aimed to reassure the United States and the international community that the rebels would not seek to establish a hardline Islamist government. However, Al-Sharʿa’s past as a member of the Islamic State, and his organization’s prior affiliation with al-Qaeda and its record of highly repressive authoritarian governance in Idlib, cast a shadow over the future of Syria.