دانلود کتاب به سوی یک چارچوب ایمنی هسته‌ای مشارکتی در شرق آسیا: درس‌هایی از تجربه اروپا

The post-Fukushima era has fundamentally reshaped the landscape of global nuclear governance. Although nuclear accidents occur within specific national territories, their consequences—environmental contamination, diplomatic friction, public health concerns, and economic disruption—inevitably transcend national borders. This transnational character of nuclear risk is particularly pronounced in East Asia, a region characterized by a high concentration of nuclear facilities, increasing energy demand, and complex geopolitical dynamics. As of December 2025, the total number of nuclear reactors in operation, under construction, or in planning stages in East Asia— centered on Japan, China, and South Korea—is projected to reach approximately 190, representing roughly 30 percent of global nuclear generating capacity. East Asia is therefore one of the most densely nuclearized regions in the world, yet it continues to lack an effective multilateral framework for nuclear safety governance. The Fukushima Daiichi accident and the subsequent diplomatic tensions and trade frictions surrounding the discharge of ALPS-treated water vividly illustrate this institutional gap. Nuclear safety governance in East Asia remains largely confined within national boundaries despite the inherently transboundary character of nuclear risk. To understand this contrast, it is necessary to reexamine the institutional structure of European nuclear safety governance. Over several decades, Europe has developed a governance architecture that has contributed to regulatory convergence, mutual confidence, and improved crisis coordination among member states. Existing scholarship has often explained these achievements primarily in terms of soft governance, especially expert networks such as the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) and the Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities (HERCA). However, this volume argues that the effectiveness of European nuclear safety governance cannot be adequately explained by soft governance alone. Rather, the real operating conditions of Europe’s system lie in the functional coupling between supranational hard governance and expert-based soft governance. The EURATOM Treaty, the European Commission, and the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) provide a legally grounded institutional framework that secures regulatory convergence and policy transmission across member states. Within that framework, WENRA, HERCA, and related expert mechanisms exercise practical influence through peer review, technical standard-setting, and crisis coordination. Europe’s relative success, therefore, is not the product of soft governance in isolation, but of a broader governance architecture in which law, expertise, and institutional learning are mutually reinforcing. By contrast, East Asia lacks a supranational hard governance framework comparable to EURATOM or the European Union. Nuclear safety remains strongly embedded within national sovereignty, and no regional legal authority exists to mandate harmonization or ensure coordinated implementation. Under such structural conditions, a direct transplantation of the European model is neither politically feasible nor normatively appropriate. Yet the absence of legally binding regional authority does not imply the impossibility of cooperation. Rather, it calls for a different institutional pathway—one capable of building high reliability under conditions of fragmentation, geopolitical sensitivity, and incomplete trust. In this sense, the central challenge for East Asia is not whether cooperation is possible, but how it can be institutionally designed in a form suited to the region’s own constraints. Against this backdrop, this book addresses two overarching questions. First, through what institutional configuration has European nuclear safety governance been able to achieve practical regulatory convergence and relatively stable crisis coordination? Second, under conditions where supranational hard governance is absent, what alternative pathway can enable East Asia to pursue high-reliability nuclear safety governance? By posing these questions, the book moves beyond conventional explanations centered solely on political trust, technical capacity, or the existence of expert networks. Instead, it argues that the key analytical issue lies in how institutional structures shape the relationship between legal authority, expert coordination, policy legitimacy, adaptive learning, and cross-border risk management. In doing so, the book shifts the analytical focus from institutional imitation to institutional design. It asks not how East Asia can replicate Europe, but how a functionally equivalent governance pathway can be constructed in a region where supranational hard governance is absent. This book further argues that nuclear safety governance in East Asia cannot be understood solely as a technical matter of regulation, engineering, or emergency planning. It is equally a matter of trustbuilding, procedural legitimacy, transparency, and socially credible risk communication. The disputes over ALPS-treated water, the difficulties of transboundary coordination, and the uneven development of safety systems across the region demonstrate that scientific evidence alone is insufficient to sustain regional cooperation when institutionalized procedures for verification, communication, and accountability are weak. East Asia’s nuclear safety problem is therefore both technical and political, both regulatory and social. A viable regional governance architecture must address not only safety standards and operational coordination, but also the institutional conditions under which technical judgments become publicly and internationally credible. By systematically comparing European and East Asian nuclear safety governance, this book makes contributions to both academic scholarship and policy practice. Theoretically, it reconceptualizes European nuclear safety governance as a hard–soft coupled model rather than a simple success story of soft governance. It also extends High-Reliability Organization (HRO) theory beyond the boundaries of single organizations to the level of regional and intergovernmental governance. Policy-wise, the book offers a concrete institutional blueprint centered on TRM+, proposing a hybrid and adaptive pathway through which East Asia can gradually build de facto bindingness, mutual confidence, and regional safety coordination without legal coercion. Moving beyond abstract calls for cooperation, it seeks to provide an implementable framework for East Asian countries seeking to overcome historical and political constraints and to construct a resilient, trust-based, and multilayered nuclear safety society.