دانلود کتاب تهاجم جنگ ترکیبی روسیه علیه غرب

On February 24, 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine. The Kremlin frames this as a “special military operation” to protect pro-Russian/Russian speaking factions in Ukraine, especially in Crimea and the Donbas in Ukraine’s east, and to “demilitarize” and “de-nazify” Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin stands at the center of the decision-making process. This book will detail why Putin was emboldened to take these actions. It will also detail the nature of his regime, and how Russian cyberespionage, at times in coordination with traditional espionage, has been effective against the West, the former Soviet space of Russia’s near abroad, and into Africa and even further afield. But for a four-year interregnum, which saw him revert to Prime Minister in a “castling move” which saw Dmitry Medvedev becoming President, Putin has been President of the Russian Federation since 2000. Putin was reelected unimpeded by serious opposition for another six-year term in March 2024. In the quarter centu ry since his first (more authentic) election in 2000, Russia has reasserted itself on the geopolitical stage. It has done so by violating the territorial integrity and political independence in parts of its near abroad and by sowing division and seeking influence over its perceived adversaries in Europe and the United States. Russia has also engaged in politico-military interventions in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya, Mozambique, and Mali. Many of these interventions were through its paramilitary proxy, the Wagner Group, led by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin. President Putin is said to be a student of history and in 2021 penned an essay which decried Ukrainian statehood and pronounced on a number of themes. Two themes are relevant to this book. The first is what he called “deliberate efforts by … forces … to undermine … unity. The formula … divide and rule … [and] sow discord among people, the overarching goal being to divide and then to pit the parts of a single people against one another.” Second, Putin also spoke of the actions of “both the official authorities and local oligarchs, who robbed the people of Ukraine and kept their stolen money in Western banks, ready to sell their motherland for the sake of preserving their capital.” Both arguments are profoundly ironic. Domestically, Russia’s renationalized natural wealth in hydrocarbons, especially oil and gas, has not been reinvested into infrastructure projects or elevated the standard of living for most Russians. Instead, it has brought great wealth to Russian government officials and enabled the same system of oligarchs that Putin describes in Ukraine. Russia has also systematically attempted to undermine the unity of Ukraine and sought to divide Western nations to further Kremlin policies. These activities are detailed in this book as part of a suite of active measures/hybrid warfare campaigns combining misinformation, disinformation and mal-information which have mined socio-po litical fault lines on issues including identity politics and nationalism, liberalism, immigration, and globalization. As set out in the preceding list of abbreviations and concepts, misinformation is information or knowledge that stems from being misinformed but is not demonstrably false or communicated with malign intent. Disinformation is false, falsified or contestable and is designed to influence and deceive target audiences. Relatedly, malinformation is purposefully designed for influence and deception campaigns with malicious intent. Each of these terms and the use of them can be contested (and they can also be hyphenated as mis-, dis-, and mal-information). More importantly, whether one perceives information (especially on social media) as falling into one or more of these categories, debating the terms and the boundaries between them can become politically and socially charged (sometimes invoking the label or dismissive charge of “fake news”). Instead, the use of these terms and contestations need to be understood alongside issue areas that include confirmation bias, media literacy, and critical thinking skills. Using terms like these can also box or silo the way we think of issues, depictions, and events whilst investing time and energy into debating meanings or contextualizing. This too is part of Kremlin designs that sees and uses social media and wider mass media and mass messaging as a globalized information space ripe for manipulation and exploitation. The aim is to influence internal politics, social discourse, national cohesion, and international relations of far distant societies and nations that it perceives it can effect (and has effected) for political and strategic ends. As Carl Miller suggests, these definitions are a distraction but for good or for ill the one “word that has really struck is disinformation”. Russia’s campaigns have also utilized their intelligence agencies (also referred to as “Special Services”) and criminal and cybercriminal fraternity in a series of business deals, political pacts, and cyberespionage campaigns that appear financially motivated, but with underlying politico-military dimensions. This is in addition to suspected sabotage and assassination operations.