دانلود کتاب تصمیم گیری و مذاکره گروهی – مسائل روش شناختی و عملی

The series of International Conferences on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) have furnished a stimulating venue for the dissemination of the latest research on the theory and practice of group decision and negotiation. Conference participants exchange, discuss, and critique their latest ideas in the field of GDN. The GDN conference has been held annually since 2000 with two exceptions: 2000 (Glasgow, UK), 2001 (La Rochelle, France), 2002 (Perth, Australia), 2003 (Istanbul, Turkey), 2004 (Banff, Canada), 2005 (Vienna, Austria), 2006 (Karlsruhe, Germany), 2007 (Mont Tremblant, Canada), 2008 (Coimbra, Portugal), 2009 (Toronto, Canada), 2010 (Delft, The Netherlands), 2011 (cancelled), 2012 (Recife, Brazil), 2013 (Stockholm, Sweden), 2014 (Toulouse, France), 2015 (Warsaw, Poland), 2016 (Bellingham, USA), 2017 (Stuttgart, Germany), 2018 (Nanjing, China), 2019 (Loughborough, UK), 2020 (Toronto, Canada—conference cancelled because of the COVID-19 pandemic and proceedings published), and 2021 (virtual conference hosted from Toronto, Canada). The 22nd International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN 2022) took place virtually (online) during June 12–16, 2022. A total of 68 submissions were received, encompassing nine main streams related to the field of GDN. After a careful and thorough review process involving the work of many reviewers, nine papers from those submissions were selected for publication in this volume entitled “Group Decision and Negotiation: Methodological and Practical Issues.” The nine papers published in this volume are organized into three sections, representing the variety of methodological and practical issues discussed at GDN 2022: • The first section on “Preference Modeling for Group Decision and Negotiation” consists of four papers. Karpov et al. extend the Hotelling-Downs model in three directions: analyzing competition under a variety of voting rules, considering the circular domain and not just the linear, and extending the results to the winner-take-all setting. Correia et al. analyze the performance of a preference elicitation protocol for multi-issue negotiations based on the Flexible and Interactive Tradeoff (FITradeoff) method through simulation experiments. Suzuki and Horita present two approaches to explore how to reach a global Pareto optimal allocation of robots (indivisible objects) based on the local preference profile. Roselli and de Almeida describe modulation provided by the FITradeoff method from behavioral studies performed using neuroscience tools conducted in two ways: modulation in the preference modeling process and modulation in the FITradeoff Decision Support System (DSS). • The second section of this volume is composed of three papers related to “Conflict Resolution.” Suzuki and Leoneti propose a way to solve the general equilibrium selection problem by means of ameta-level structure, in which each player is assumed to select an equilibrium as their principle of behavior and that such a selection itself makes another game. Philpot et al. use the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) to investigate conflict over expanding aggregate mining at the Alliston Aquifer in the Township of Tiny, Ontario, shedding light on a growing class of multijurisdictional resources conflict. Sharma et al. discuss the use of the concepts of path dependency and leverage points to better understand the complex Cauvery River dispute and recommend the most effective leverage points, including changing the rules of the system as well as the paradigm out of which the system arises. • The last section on “Collaborative Decision Making Processes” contains two studies of different strategic decision processes. Tanaka et al. apply sentiment analysis to extract the positive, negative, and neutral comments posted on news sites to visualize the social atmosphere by calculating the approval rating of the people’s comments. The methodology is demonstrated by analyzing postings regarding COVID-19. Gerchak extends the buy-sell procedure of dissolving two-party partnerships to dissolve threeparty partnerships.