دانلود کتاب اکونومیست 22 – چرا جنگ اکراین احتمال درگیری هسته ای را بیشتر میکند.

One hundred days ago Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine by warning of a nuclear strike. Having exalted Russia’s atomic arsenal and promised Ukraine’s subjugation, he threatened countries tempted to interfere with consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history”. Russian tv has since tantalised viewers with chit-chat about Armageddon. Even if he never uses the bomb in Ukraine, Mr Putin has thus already upset the nuclear order. After his threats, nato limited the support it was prepared to offer, with two implications that are all the more worrying for having been drowned out by the drumbeat of Russia’s conventional campaign. One is that vulnerable states that see the world through Ukraine’s eyes will feel that the best defence against a nuclear-armed aggressor is to have weapons of their own. The other is that other nucleararmed states will believe that they can gain by copying Mr Putin’s tactics. If so, someone somewhere will surely turn their threat into reality. That must not be this war’s devastating legacy. The nuclear danger was growing before the invasion. North Korea has dozens of warheads. Iran, the un said this week, has enough enriched uranium for its first bomb. Although the New start treaty will limit Russia’s and America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles until 2026, it does not cover weapons such as nuclear torpedoes. Pakistan is rapidly adding to its arsenal. China is modernising its nuclear forces and, the Pentagon says, expanding them.