دانلود کتاب تصمیمات هسته ای – تغییر دوره برنامه های سلاح های هسته ای

The historical record demonstrates that states do not initiate nuclear weapons programs and then uniformly follow linear paths to a singular goal. One possible explanation for erratic progression is political meddling in scientific research and development. Jacques E. C. Hymans argues that leaders who are unconstrained by state institutions often interfere in nuclear weapons programs, unintentionally disrupting progress toward the bomb. Whether scientists are free to pursue their work in ways that will advance good research and development or instead face strong incentives to appease repressive leaders through shortcuts and false reporting should affect a program’s timeline. This compelling argument about time- to- outcome, however, cannot explain the form a nuclear weapons program takes. Implicit in Hymans’s argument are the assumptions that states have a common goal— to quickly produce nuclear weapons— and take linear paths to the bomb. The observation that few states had obtained a speedy outcome led Hymans to conclude that something had gone wrong. However, while racing to the bomb was more common during the early Cold War, for most of the nuclear age the full- speed- ahead approach has been the exception, not the rule. Rather, leaders have exhibited a range of preferences regarding the importance and necessity of quickly acquiring a nuclear arsenal. If these nonlinear pathways are not a deviation— if nuclear weapons development is instead typically nonlinear— then interference with project management cannot be a sufficient explanation. I argue that the paths to the bomb are rarely linear because they are interrupted and reformed by nuclear decisions. Leaders may allow a nuclear weapons program to maintain the course it is on or even decide to slow or suspend its development. Domestic organizations are a key source of expert information that shapes the leader’s perception of the value and strategic purpose of the nuclear program. Another possible explanation is that changes in the security environment prompt a state to move toward or away from the bomb. Security concerns are an important motivator for the initial decision to start a nuclear weapons program. Yet the security explanation, too, is insufficient. States that do decide to begin a program may exist in insecurity for years before choosing the nuclear path. And once a nuclear weapons program is underway, many leaders appear to make nuclear decisions that are not based on either stable or changing external security environments. If security were the sole driver of nuclear decisions, we would expect to see acceleration decisions during times of high insecurity and reversal decisions during times of low insecurity. The case studies I conduct in this book do not indicate the presence of such a dynamic. For example, India’s program slowed significantly in the mid- to late 1970s, despite nuclear weapons progress in its regional rivals, China and Pakistan. South Korea did not accelerate its program when its security environment worsened. Brazil gave up its pursuit of nuclear weapons despite little to no change in its security environment. South Africa sprinted toward a nuclear arsenal despite its significant regional military superiority. Perhaps deep concerns over Soviet interference in southern Africa, or even fears of invasion, could explain South Africa’s proliferation curve instead— but then why did Pretoria implement two different program reversals, well before the fall of the Soviet Union?