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The return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty on July  ,  997, was a diplomatic, moral, and psychological victory for China. It ended the humiliating “unequal treaties” that had begun in January  84  with the cession of Hong Kong Island to Britain during the Opium War ( 839–  842). Overnight, this former British colony became the first Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It was followed two years later by Macau, which had been occupied by the Portuguese in the mid- 500s. In the two-plus decades since, the Chinese government has frequently reminded Hong Kong (and the world) how much its continued prosperity – indeed, its very survival – depend on Beijing’s support and goodwill. Meanwhile, since  997 but especially over the past few years, many Hong Kong people have become increasingly hostile toward the Chinese government and the mainland in general, identifying as Hong Kong people – Hongkongese or Hongkongers (Heunggongyahn) – rather than as Chinese. This form of self-identification had emerged much earlier. But it became even more widespread as Hong Kong became further integrated with mainland China. The annual protest march on July  , for example, quickly became an occasion to express dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong and Chinese governments. In  998, marchers protested against President Jiang Zemin’s visit. In  999, activists shouting “Democracy for China” interrupted Vice President Hu Jintao’s speech at the unveiling ceremony for a monument commemorating Hong Kong’s reunification with China. In 2004, hundreds of thousands protested the Chinese government’s decision to prohibit general elections in the SAR. During the 20 2 march, the largest in almost one decade, the participants voiced their usual demands and complaints: universal suffrage for Hong Kong and too much interference from Beijing. And a small but noticeable number of marchers began to wave the British and former Hong Kong colonial flags. These actions stirred further controversy, especially when an internet movement called for Hong Kong to become an independent state. (In the entire history of colonial Hong Kong, no one had ever issued such a demand, nor was there a single attempt to overthrow the government or return to Chinese sovereignty.) In October, protesters waved British and colonial Hong Kong flags in front of the Chinese government’s liaison office, chanting slogans such as “We Are Hongkongers, Not Chinese.” Condemning such actions, Lu Ping, the former head of the Chinese State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, dismissed advocates for independence as “sheer morons.” Without support from the mainland, he insisted, Hong Kong would become a “dead city.” During the 20 3 march, a new slogan appeared: “Chinese Colonists Get Out.” Since then, relations between Hong Kong and mainland China have become even worse. In 20 5, concerns about the SAR’s autonomy intensified when five booksellers connected to a local shop selling books banned in the mainland went missing and mysteriously appeared across the border. In January 20 7, a Chinese-Canadian billionaire known for managing assets for the families of prominent Chinese leaders vanished from his hotel, leaving many to believe that he too had been snatched by mainland agents. The main theme for the July march was “One Country, Two Systems: A Lie for Twenty Years.” But that year’s march included two new slogans: “Hong Kong Independence” and “Hong Kong Is Not China.” According to a survey in December 20 9, only    percent of the respondents considered themselves Chinese – the lowest level since  997. The national security law passed on June 30, 2020, during the COVID- 9 pandemic and following months of protest and social unrest in 20 9, has only further inflamed these long-simmering tensions. It has convinced many Hong Kong people that their city will lose its autonomy well before 2047, when the “one country, two systems” arrangement that guarantees Hong Kong’s special administrative status will end.