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The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is arguably the most politically powerful military officer in the United States. Part of his influence is due to formal authority. Besides being the highestranking member of the armed forces, numerous laws have given him increased clout over the individual military leaders who head the army, navy, air force, and marine corps, known collectively as the JCS. He is also officially designated as the primary military adviser to the president as well as the defense secretary and the National Security Council. In these roles, his advice and recommendations have significant sway over decisions about military strategy, operations, and spending. But part of the chairman’s power comes from the broader ramifications of these policy choices. For example, Chairman Mike Mullen’s strong endorsement of a troop surge in 2009 helped not only to convince President Barak Obama, but also contributed to maintaining a coalition of allied forces as well as a nation- building strategy in Afghanistan that ultimately failed. The spending limits mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011 have been repeatedly increased thanks in part to repeated arguments by senior military officers, such as Chairman Joseph Dunford, that real growth over inflation is required for national security. In 2007, when Chairman Peter Pace labelled homosexuality immoral, it brought swift condemnation from Congress as well as various civil society groups because of concerns his comments would prompt discrimination in the military but also more broadly. Besides formal authority and the far- reaching consequences of choices about defense policy, the chairman’s political power is also derivative of the choices he makes about how to fill his role as the most visible military officer in the United States. Mark Milley, who started a four- year term in October 2019, offers multiple examples of the chairman’s influence, both intentional and inadvertent. During the 2021 presidential election, Milley became concerned that President Donald Trump’s aggressive behavior, which coincided with U.S. military exercises in the South China Sea, would be interpreted by China as a precursor to military action. Without informing civilian leaders or receiving direction from them, Milley called his counterpart in China to offer reassurances that the U.S. government was stable and not prone to reckless aggression. Less than a month later, Milley again sparked controversy when he suggested to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi that the military would override any decision by President Trump to launch nuclear weapons. The year prior, in June 2020, Milley perhaps unintentionally took part in a photo op with President Trump and members of the cabinet that many interpreted as a campaign stunt with authoritarian and racist overtones. Milley found it necessary to offer a public apology for “creating a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.” Milley’s actions certainly fueled already existing partisan disputes. He received praise, mostly from Democrats, and was labeled a traitor by Trump supporters. But there was also disagreement among scholars of civilmilitary relations. Had Milley’s actions violated long- standing norms about the proper role of the military in politics? Did they, as some argued, cross a line into inappropriately political behavior that undermines the trust Americans have in the military? Or is the military’s professionalism such that it can withstand temporary violations of the assumed boundaries between the military and politics?