دانلود کتاب تئوری بازی ها و کاربردهای تجاری

Like its predecessor (Chatterjee and Samuelson 2002), the aim of this new edition is to provide the interested reader a broad and (we hope) deep view of the way business decisions can be modelled and analyzed using game theory. The chapter contents embrace a wide variety of business functions – from accounting to finance to operations to marketing to organizational design. Moreover, specific application areas include R&D strategies, bargaining, settlement negotiations in the shadow of litigation, strategic behavior in legal settings, contractual issues in the academic labor market, auctions and competitive bidding, and experimental economics. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings – that is to say, situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their respective self-interests take actions that together affect all of their fortunes. In the language of game theory, players take actions consistent with the given “rules of the game,” and these joint actions determine final outcomes and payoffs. Besides providing a structure in which tomodel competitive settings, game theory goes a longway toward answering the key question: What optimal decision or action should a competitor take, all the while anticipating optimal actions from one’s rivals? Provided the game-theoretic description faithfully captures the real-world competitive situation at hand, game theory provides a compelling guide for business strategy. From its birth with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), and for its next 25 years, game theory was principally a mathematical discipline. To be sure, elegant solution concepts were developed – but for a relatively limited class of settings (such as zero-sum games). In the last 30 years, however, game theory has been applied to a growing number of practical problems: from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. Game theory is a staple of doctoral studies in economics, finance, and management science. Indeed, there are many excellent texts in the subject: Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Myerson (1997) Rasmusen (2006), or Dixit et al. (2009) to name a few. Perhaps, a better barometer of the growing importance of game-theoretic ideas in business and management is the growing place of the discipline in mainstream texts in strategy, microeconomics, and managerial economics. Notable among these are Milgrom and Roberts (1992), McAfee (2005), and Besanko et al. (2012). Besides economics, strategy, and finance, the marketing area has also been a fertile area for gametheoretic applications. See, for example,Wernerfelt (1995) and Bagwell (2007). As noted by Sridhar Moorthy in Chap. 4, an analysis of key words of 2,300 articles published in marketing science between 1982 and 2011 shows “game theory to be the second most popular key word after ‘pricing’.” By contrast, 30 years ago, game theory was absent from most textbooks and most research work. The chapters of this second edition outline some of the most interesting applications of game theory in non-technical terms. Chapters 2, 3, and 7 are retained from the first edition, while Chaps. 5, 6, 13, and 14 have been extensively revised and updated to reflect new research over the last decade. The remaining six chapters are new and original contributions covering marketing, research and development strategies, out-of-court settlements, law and economics, the role of academic tenure, and experimental economics. We presuppose that the reader has a working knowledge of basic game-theoretic concepts and results: from Nash and Bayesian equilibrium, to moral hazard and adverse selection. (Any of the game theory and economics texts cited above are good places to turn for re-enforcing the basic tools.) The first section of this volume discusses game-theoretic applications in five functional areas of business: finance, accounting, marketing, operations management and information systems, and organization design. The second section considers important applications including strategic behavior in bargaining settings and legal settings, the peculiar institution of academic tenure, auctions and competitive bidding institutions, and experimental economics. The emphasis is on the contributions of game theory to both theory and practice. It goes without saying that no single book can include the contributions of game theory in all aspects of business. Omitted from this volume are such important topic areas as: regulation (including antitrust practices), strategic aspects of the recent financial crisis, and ecommerce applications.