دانلود کتاب شکافت و همجوشی متحدان -تلاش هسته‌ای جمهوری کره و رقابت و همکاری ایالات متحده و فرانسه

Prof. Lyong Choi started this project as a case of proliferation of nuclear weapons, one of the most critical issues in international security, and international efforts to deter it. Most nuclear weapon aspirants developed their ambitions with their partnership state(s) with advanced nuclear technologies. Some of those aspirants succeeded in their nuclear weapons program after the partnership ended. Those states often faced pressure and checks from other states and/or non-proliferation regimes, which, in most cases, prevented the spread of nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. has been one of the key actors in non-proliferation efforts, it sometimes failed to deter the spread of nuclear weapons. Many books discuss the cases of its failure, and we can learn from the failures of Washington’s non-proliferation efforts. Yet Prof. Choi also found it meaningful to understand how and why the U.S. materialized its efforts for non-proliferation in most cases. He thus focuses on one of the most successful cases of U.S. non-proliferation effort: the case of South Korea (hereinafter the ROK, Republic of Korea).
While investigating the ROK–France contract for reprocessing facilities and the U.S.–ROK conflicts surrounding the ROK’s attempts for nuclear weapons devel-opment, Prof. Choi felt the need to expand the perspective to include U.S.–France relations. Therefore, at some point in the spring of 2018, he suggested to Prof. Jooy-oung Lee that he join the research. Prof. Lee, whose fields were the U.S. in the World and Cold War history, seemed to be the right scholar to work with. When Prof. Lee gladly joined the study, the long journey of this joint research by a political scientist and a historian began.
In the beginning, we spent time sharing issues and questions on the topic. We then conducted archival research to obtain relevant sources. Prof. Choi often carried out research about the ROK’s nuclear project at the Diplomatic Archive of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy. He began to search for more materials since he came to be interested in the ways in which the Korean government tried to acquire the legal approval of the international regime by getting the IAEA involved in the ROK–France plutonium reprocessing deal in preparation for U.S. intervention. Prof. Lee conducted research in various archives including NARA, UCLA, and the Nixon Library in the U.S. In particular, he met with Dr. William Burr of the Woodrow Wilcon Center, who had already been communicating with Dr. Choi regarding the topic. Dr. Burr, who studied secret assistance by the U.S. to the French nuclear program and ROK’s nuclear history, gave him very useful advice on the topic and archival research there. Dr. Burr, however, had yet to find any definitive evidence on how and why the French and/or ROK government(s) decided to cancel the reprocessing deal. He also did not expect that any clear evidence would be released sooner or later. This was somewhat frustrating, but also motivated us to search for answers to our research questions.
When the research progressed, we met and discussed the findings. The most inter-esting part of this joint research was the periodic meeting as well as communication by phone and email. This was very intellectually stimulating for each other and further advanced the research. New questions often arose and the scope of the study widened. First, we found that the ROK’s development of nuclear weapons and its reprocessing deal with France was closely related to changes in U.S. foreign policy in general and its alliance policy specifically. We could also understand that the improvement of U.S.–France relations played a significant role in the ROK’s attempt. We thus expanded the scope of our study to the broader trilateral relations among the U.S., France, and the ROK beyond the narrow U.S.–ROK relations. Since we saw the issue as a problem of trilateral relations, we could also understand why the issue was hard to resolve. France could not cancel its contract with the ROK without firm nuclear assistance from the U.S. The ROK could not abandon its nuclear weapons develop-ment before resolving its security crisis. The U.S. had not yet found solutions to the ROK and France. Despite the broadened scope of our research, we did not find a smoking gun showing how the trilateral relations were resolved.
As the study made progress, we had more questions. However, the sources were limited. Since most policymakers of the 1970s died or were unable to communicate, we had difficulties in finding sources of the negotiations between the ROK and France regarding the nuclear agreement. But then we heard that primary documents of Hyung Seop Choi, then Minister of Science and Technology, existed somewhere. While we had difficulty in locating the sources, we ultimately found the Hyung Seop Choi Archive thanks to the help of Dr. Seong Jun Kim, who studied the history of Korean atomic energy. The sources in the archive were very useful and thus accelerated our study. We also needed more sources of the U.S. and France. The Digital National Security Archive was one of the helpful places where we could get necessary information on U.S.–France and U.S.–Korean nuclear relations. Despite the difficulty, we could get access to the archive and search for the sources we needed with support from the UNIST library. We also read and discussed more literature on French nuclear diplomacy.