دانلود کتاب تسخیر شده توسط هرج و مرج – استراتژی بزرگ چین از مائو تسه تونگ تا شی جین پینگ

For all the interest China has excited in the last several years, its grand strategy—the way in which it marshals different forms of power to pursue national objectives—has yet to be explored properly. Those who invoke the term often miss its historical roots and scope; then too, their work tends to ascribe a menace to the country’s goals that would surprise Chinese grand strategists themselves. Historians have done excellent work on Chinese foreign policy, but have yet to produce a comparative study of the basic ideas of national security underpinning the conduct of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Unremarked by much of the work on China, there has been, from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, a consistent definition of national goals and a harnessing of military, diplomatic, economic, and political means to pursue those goals.1 Historical interest aside—and the history is fascinating—the subject demands attention for a practical reason. At a time when hopes and fears of China are fervent and ill-informed in equal measure, it is important to explore the calculus behind Chinese decision-making, to attempt to see the world the way China’s leaders do. Understanding alone cannot make for sound policy, but it is a crucial first step. This book seeks such understanding through a “structured, focused comparison” of the grand strategies pursued by the PRC’s paramount leaders: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. What were the operational codes—the deep assumptions about life—that shaped their conduct?2 How did they perceive the world around them? What were the goals they defined and pursued? How did they meld different categories of power in pursuit of their objectives? And how well did their grand strategies work in the real world? There are, of course, limitations to such an approach to the study of China’s foreign relations and national security. China’s grand strategists—like people in other walks of life—were capable of inconsistency, sometimes surprising themselves as much as the historian on their trail. Besides, there are only so many things that even the best grand strategist can account for. Much that has been important in China’s life—the unemployed who take up the life of hired thugs, the cadres gambling in North Korea and Macau, the disappearance of mahi mahi from the near seas—has happened outside the realm of grand strategy, presenting problems that Beijing must then scramble to respond to. Nevertheless, the men in question did practice grand strategy, which, for all it left out, encompassed quite a bit too. A closer look at what those grand strategies involved is well worthwhile.