دانلود کتاب کانت در مورد احترام – فلسفه امانوئل کانت

Kant considered the problem of rational moral motivation as one of the great questions in practical philosophy. In the introduction to his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant raises the question of “whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will or whether it can be a determining ground of the will only as empirically conditioned” (5:16). In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant refers to this problem even more explicitly, stating that “[n]obody can or ever will comprehend how the understanding should have a motivating power; it can admittedly judge, but to give this judgement power so that it becomes a motive able to impel the will to performance of an action – to understand this is the philosophers’ stone” (27:1225). Of special importance for his theory of rational moral motivation is Kant’s conception of the moral feeling of respect or reverence (Achtung). This very feeling can be understood as the “philosopher’s stone” that Kant referred to in his Lectures on Ethics, and it has been described as “one of the linchpins of Kant’s moral theory” (DeWitt 2014, 62) and “one of the most controversial terms in his entire practical philosophy” (Berg 2021, 733). Kant himself called it a “paradox” that “respect for a mere idea” – namely the moral law – “is yet to serve as an inflexible precept of the will” (4:439). Recently, there has been growing interest in Kant’s conception of emotions and feelings in general, and in Kant’s conception of moral respect in particular. This interest is motivated by the variety of roles that respect plays in Kant’s philosophical work. It not only concerns moral motivation in the narrower sense but also the question of autonomy and freedom, of moral imputability, and of moral education. Kant made several “extremely cryptic” (Allison 1990, 125), “enigmatic,” and “puzzling” (McCarty 1993, 421) statements about the “singular” (sonderbar) and “peculiar” (eigentümlich) (5:76) status of respect, attributing the following seven characteristics to it: (i) it has a purely rational origin, and it is therefore distinguished from empirical feelings (I shall refer to this as the Rationality Thesis); (ii) it is considered as “the sole and also the undoubted moral incentive” (I shall refer to this point as the Singularity Thesis); (iii) it is both negative and positive with regard to its emotional content (I shall refer to this as the Emotion Thesis); (iv) in feeling respect, the human self is at the same time bound and free (I shall refer to this as the Freedom Thesis); (v) it is “morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive” (I shall refer to this as the Subjectivity Thesis); (vi) it primarily refers to a nonempirical object, an abstract “law,” and not to individual human persons (I shall refer to this as the Intentionality Thesis); (vii) it is not a moral duty but the “basis” (Grund) for moral duties, and we have the duty to cultivate it and show it to other persons (I shall refer to this as the Normativity Thesis).